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The Baltic Churches and the Challenges of the
Post-Communist World
Mikko Ketola
This article analyses and describes the recent history of the Baltic churches, their
theological reorientation and the challenges they have encountered in the post-
Communist Baltic society. The focus is on the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian
Lutheran churches whereas the Catholic and Orthodox churches receive less
attention. It is ﬁrst demonstrated that much has changed since the Second World
War regarding the churches’ membership numbers and their societal position.
The article then pays attention to two phenomena that have caused much
discussion not only within the churches but also among foreign observers: the fear
that the Lutheran Church will surrender to the Catholic Church, and the quite
opposite anxiety that the Lutheran Church–Missouri Synod will grow too
inﬂuential within Baltic Lutheranism. Finally, the author examines the way the
Baltic churches have been involved in politics during the last two decades.
Keywords: Lutheranism in the Baltic countries; religion in the Baltic countries;
Lutheran Church–Missouri Synod; Estonia; Latvia; Lithuania; religion and
politics; theological conservatism; homosexualism and the Church
In the following, I shall concentrate on post-1989/1991 developments within the
Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian Lutheran churches. Consequently, this article will
be less illuminating on the Catholic and Orthodox churches and other, smaller
Christian churches in the three Baltic countries. Thus I have had to leave out, for
instance, Pope John Paul II’s pastoral visitation to the Baltic states in 1993, the ﬁrst
to former Soviet republics. Another issue that would easily merit an article of its own
is the rift between the two Orthodox churches in Estonia, the one under the Moscow
Patriarchate and the other under the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople,
which opened in the ﬁrst half of the 1990s and culminated in a temporary suspension
of eucharistic communion between the two patriarchates. Still another issue, which
would be of great interest, is the problematic process of Vergangenheitsbewa¨ltigung
or the struggle to come to terms with the past, be it in the area of general politics or
within the churches. In order to keep this article within reasonable bounds, however,
I shall only point to another article in which I have dealt with that issue.1
All this does not mean that I would consider Lutheranism alone the most
signiﬁcant form of Christianity in today’s Baltic countries. However, when writing
1Cf. Ketola, ‘The Baltic Churches’.
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about such a multifaceted phenomenon as contemporary Baltic Christianity, one
must choose between treating all actors equally but at the same time superﬁcially and
raising some particularly burning issues that one can look at more closely. Viewing
all the Baltic churches together naturally carries the danger that the picture becomes
too generalised and uniﬁed. I have tried to avoid that. It also goes without saying –
but I shall point it out anyway – that it is diﬃcult, if not impossible, to oﬀer deﬁnite
analyses and explanations about events and developments belonging to the neueste
Zeitgeschichte. For this reason, I would like to characterise most of my analyses as
hypotheses demanding further and deeper research.2
The changing religious demographics of the Baltic states
Before the Second World War, one could conﬁdently label the Baltic countries
according to religion. Estonia was overwhelmingly Lutheran (78%), Latvia was
clearly Lutheran (55%) and Lithuania almost completely Catholic. Labelling is
much more diﬃcult today. The changes from the 1930s to the start of the twenty-ﬁrst
century have been comprehensive. For instance, whereas one could call the Lutheran
churches of Estonia and Latvia national or people’s churches in the 1930s, today
they must be called minority or mission churches in a highly secularised society. In
Estonia, the Lutheran Church today has only about 39,000 paying or registered
members (4% of the population), and in Latvia the absolute number is only a little
higher: around 41,000 (around 2%). In Lithuania, the ethnic make-up of the
Lutheran Church changed markedly at the end of the Second World War when the
Potsdam Conference of 1945 attributed the former German Memel Region with its
many Lutheran parishes to the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic. Today, there
are only around 21,000 active members in the Evangelical Lutheran Church of
Lithuania.
However, the actual membership numbers the churches themselves give are
usually much higher, in Estonia 180,000 and in Latvia 400,000. This means about
13% and 20% of the population, respectively. The discrepancy between these two
sets of numbers is explained partly by the fact that the churches count as their
members all baptised and conﬁrmed people, even if they no longer are active
members; furthermore, it is usual that in families only one family member pays the
Church membership fee. According to a 2007 poll by the Ministry of Justice, 80% of
Lithuanians were Roman Catholics.3
A diﬀerent matter altogether are various opinion polls which produce data about
how many people consider themselves Lutheran, Catholic, etc. In Estonia and Latvia
the percentage of people who consider themselves Lutheran is usually in the range
50–60%. Many of these people could probably be called cultural Lutherans who,
however, often have a very poor knowledge of the basic tenets and language of
Lutheranism.4
2A ﬁne collection of analyses on post-1989 developments in the Central and Eastern European
churches is Katharina Kunter and Jens Holger Schjørring, Die Kirchen und das Erbe des
Kommunismus.
3Figures are according to the International Religious Freedom Report 2008 by the US
Department of State. http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2008 (accessed 29 May 2009).
4So, e.g., the late Estonian LutheranArchbishop JaanKiivit. Cf. Kiivit, ‘Uskonnonvapaustilanne
Virossa’, 550.
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When we compare these latest numbers with those of the 1930s, we can see how
drastically the religious map has changed. Furthermore, when we consider the fact
that the percentage of the Orthodox Estonians is a little under 13% and increasing
steadily, whereas the number of the Lutherans is slowly decreasing, it looks like the
Orthodox Church will soon be Estonia’s largest denomination. The Estonian
sociologist Jaanus Plaat has pointed out three reasons for the fact that by 2000 the
number of those who regard themselves as Orthodox has almost reached that of the
Lutherans. In the ﬁrst place, this is due to the great number of Orthodox
non-Estonians (mostly Russians). This is compounded by the increasing inﬂuence of
the Orthodox Church subordinated to the Moscow Patriarchate among the Russian-
speaking population in the 1990s. And third, the Estonian Evangelical Lutheran
Church has steadily been losing members.5
In Latvia, the Catholic Church boasts nearly half a million baptised members, of
which around half are said to be active members of the Church. To many observers it
seems certain that Latvia could soon be called a Catholic country.6 Even the
Orthodox Church has nearly as many members as the Lutheran Church. Still, one
cannot trust these ﬁgures completely. In any case, it is certain that there is no return
to the dominance of Lutheranism in Estonia and Latvia. Furthermore, in Estonia,
the membership of the Lutheran Church has been on the decline since the beginning
of the 1990s. This has been most evident in the countryside, where the Estonian
state’s severe agricultural policy has led to emptying villages and thus the liquidation
of many parishes as well. In most countryside parishes, membership numbers rarely
exceed 400. Declining numbers evidently lead to a marginalisation of the church in
civil society and in democratic political life. The current economic crisis has forced
an increasing number of Estonian Lutheran pastors working in small parishes to
take a second job in order make a decent living. Their average salary is usually
around 400 euros a month.7
In Lithuania, the Catholic Church still comprises formally around 80% of the
people, but many experts doubt whether Lithuania ought to be called a Catholic
country any longer. It has been estimated that as little as 15% of Lithuanians are
active, churchgoing Catholics. Although the Catholic Church united Lithuanians
across a wide front in her ideological resistance to Soviet totalitarianism, it seems
that the Church’s mass appeal was more political than spiritual. It appears that the
Catholic Church in Lithuania has had to concede ground to advancing secularisation
almost to the same degree as have other churches in post-Communist societies. In
general, however, the Catholic Church seems to have weathered the anti-religious
ideology and policies of Communism better than the Protestant churches. If we take
Latvia, it seems that Catholic lay people especially remained loyal to their Church to
a higher degree than their counterparts in the Lutheran Church. Even in Estonia, the
minuscule Catholic Church appears to be growing comparatively faster than either
the Lutheran or the Orthodox churches. Then again, this is the situation in Finland
as well, where the growth of the relatively small Catholic Church is fuelled primarily
by immigration.
5Plaat, ‘Eesti’, 588; Plaat, ‘Christian’, 102.
6Benz, ‘Wird Lettland katholisch?’, 25–8.
7Jussi Rytko¨nen, ‘Viron papisto turvautuu sivuto¨ihin’ [The Estonian clergy has to take
recourse to second jobs]. Kotimaa.ﬁ. http://www.kotimaa.ﬁ/index.php?option¼com_
content&task¼view&id¼8709&Itemid¼38 (accessed 28 May 2009).
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None of the Baltic churches are state churches, although in Latvia and Lithuania
the state recognises and favours certain traditional or historic religious communities.
In Latvia the government distinguishes between ‘traditional’ (Lutheran, Roman
Catholic, Orthodox, Old Believers, Baptists and Jewish) and ‘new’ religions.8 In
Lithuania, the constitution speciﬁes as historic the following nine religious
communities: Latin Rite Catholics, Greek Rite Catholics, Evangelical Lutherans,
Evangelical Reformed Church, Orthodox Christians (Moscow Patriarchate), Old
Believers, Jews, Sunni Muslims and Karaites.9 In Estonia, all churches are equal
before the law.
According to several recent studies, Estonia has become one of the most
secularised countries in the world. Only a little more than 30% of Estonians confess
to a religious faith. In the media, the long-advanced secularisation is usually
regarded as a positive development. The Estonian Lutheran theologian Urmas Petti
has described the attitude thus: ‘Educated and rational people as we all like to regard
ourselves don’t believe in stories about fairies, Father Christmas or God. In the
second place, we don’t need the guardianship of any institution, like the church’. In
fact, one can often observe Estonians expressing pride in their country’s high degree
of secularisation.10 This was aptly reﬂected in a recent Estonian advertising
competition, where a youth team called Funda won the ﬁrst prize in their class with a
tourism poster using only a map of Estonia and a couple of lines from John
Lennon’s song ‘Imagine’: ‘Nothing to kill or die for / And no religion too’.11
The spectre of Catholicism?
The diminishing stature and inﬂuence of the Lutheran churches in Latvia and
Estonia has recently caused reactions in connection with which it is perhaps
appropriate to paraphrase Karl Marx: A spectre is haunting the Baltic Lutherans –
the spectre of Catholicism. Fear of Catholicism is not a new phenomenon in Estonia
and Latvia. It was especially strong in the 1930s when the Vatican was actively and
conspicuously looking for closer contact with the Estonian and Latvian Orthodox in
order to ﬁnd out whether the Orthodox churches were interested in starting union
negotiations with the Catholic Church. At the time this caused anxiety especially
among the strongly confessional Baltic German Lutherans.12
On 12 April 2009, the Latvian state broadcasting company released news that the
Latvian Lutheran Church was planning to negotiate a merger with the Catholic
Church in Latvia. However, it soon turned out that the news was highly premature,
or, in the words of the Lutheran Archbishop Janis Vanags, ‘grotesque and in an
8Latvia. International Religious Freedom Report 2008. US Department of State. http://
www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2008/108454.htm (accessed 29 May 2009).
9Lithuania. International Religious Freedom Report 2008. US Department of State. http://
www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2008/108456.htm (accessed 29 May 2009).
10Petti, ‘Estnische’, 122. Also Altnurme, ‘Vergangenheitsbewa¨ltigung und Neuanfang?’, 138.
11‘Noored tutvustavad Eestit paganliku maana’ [Youths present Estonia as a heathen country],
Postimees, 12April 2008, http://www.postimees.ee/160408/esileht/meedia/323393.php (accessed
28 May 2009).
12I have recently started a research project on the Vatican’s intentions regarding the Baltic
countries in the 1930s based on the newly released documents in the Vatican Secret Archives.
Cf. for instance P. Rittmeister, SJ, ‘Die Lage der Orthodoxie in Estland’ (written probably in
Summer 1934), Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Aﬀari Ecclesiastici Straordinari, Paesi Baltici, 4.
periodo, pos. 93, fasc. 99.
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absurd way taken out of context’. Vanags had in fact met in November 2008 with
Cardinal Walter Kasper, President of the Pontiﬁcal Council for Promoting Christian
Unity, at the Vatican and soon after that with the Latvian Cardinal Janis Pujats to
discuss relations between the two churches, but these two meetings were reportedly
only meant to increase mutual knowledge and provide an opportunity for comparing
notes. Vanags said that the two churches had been in close contact for a long time
but there were still many grave points of theological disagreement.13
On the one hand, it was not surprising that an outside observer would assume a
merger between the churches was drawing near. They had been co-operating closely
and publicly on many social questions, and Archbishop Vanags had repeatedly
stressed that the smaller Lutheran Church had to take into consideration the
conservative opinions and position of its bigger sister churches, both Catholic and
Orthodox, when speaking out on issues such as the ordination of women or same-sex
relationships. Vanags had stopped ordaining women after he became Archbishop in
1993. Indeed, two Latvian researchers opined already in 1999 that attitudes towards
many things in the Latvian Lutheran Church ‘can be described as Catholic’ and the
Lutheran Church had never been closer to the Catholic Church.14
However, one has to remember that the Latvian Lutheran Church is still far even
from internal unity. Spiritual and structural uniﬁcation of the Latvian Evangelical
Lutheran Church and the Latvian Evangelical Lutheran Church Abroad is not in
sight. There are so many diﬀering theological opinions within the Church that
Archbishop Vanags has described attending a pastors’ conference as being ‘at an
ecumenical assembly rather than at a meeting of our Church’.15 It would thus be a
very challenging task to reach any sort of doctrinal agreement between two such
disparate parties as the Catholic Church and the Latvian Evangelical Lutheran
Church.
Latvia is not the only Baltic country where the spectre of Catholicism has been
used as a weapon by those who are obviously concerned that the Catholic Church is
gaining too much ground at the expense of the Lutheran Church. In Estonia, these
anxieties came to the fore in connection with the process of approving a new Service
Book for the Lutheran Church. It had been in preparation since the early 1990s. The
creators of the new Service Book aimed to renew the liturgy following in the ﬁrst
place the example of similar reforms in the Finnish, Scandinavian and other
Lutheran churches. This included better involvement of the laity in the service, more
Bible reading, new church music and so on.
As the time for voting on the new Service Book approached, it became clear that
many pastors and church musicians in the Estonian Lutheran Church were strongly
opposed to the renewal of the liturgy. They demanded that those who could not
accept the new liturgical order be allowed to continue using the old Service Book. In
their view, the new order was foreign to traditional Estonian Lutheran sensibilities
and far too Catholic. They were especially suspicious of the use of the word ‘Mass’
and worried that the sermon would no longer be the most important part of the
service. The opponents of the new Service Book claimed that there was an inﬂuential
13‘La¨ti peapiiskop: luteri kirik ei liitu katoliku kirikuga’ [The Latvian Archbishop: The
Lutheran Church won’t merge with the Catholic Church], Eesti Pa¨evaleht, 13 April 2009,
http://www.epl.ee/artikkel/465240 (accessed 29 May 2009).
14Gills & Krumina-Konkova, ‘The Latvian’, 204.
15Zviedre, ‘Life Stories’, 199–200.
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‘interest group’ within the Church which in reality regarded the Catholic Church as
the only true church and wanted to lead the Estonian Lutheran Church
surreptitiously into its arms. They called the members of this group ‘cryptocat-
holics’.16 This was an obvious reference to High Church circles within the Estonian
Lutheran Church. The struggle between Low Church and High Church ideas in the
Church had its roots at the time when Estonia became independent and the Lutheran
Church elected the ﬁrst Estonian bishop, Jakob Kukk.17
In the Lutheran Church Theologians’ Conference in January 2008 the proposal
for the new Service Book won a simple majority but not the two-thirds majority
which was required for approval. Thus it could not be sent forward to the Church
Diet. Discussion became so heated that warnings about an impending church
division were aired. Archbishop Andres Po˜der was even seriously asked in an
interview whether the Estonian Lutheran Church could turn into a Catholic Church,
to which he curtly replied, ‘no’.18
However, although it seems obvious that the anxiety of those who fear the
cryptocatholics’ devious plans is misguided, even paranoid, there are signs that there
will in the future be closer ecumenical contacts between the Catholic Church and the
Baltic Lutheran churches. A joint theological conference between the churches is said
to be in the planning stages.19
The growing inﬂuence of the Lutheran Church–Missouri Synod
Perhaps the most weighty factor speaking against an impending merger of the
churches is the fact that the Lutheran churches of Latvia and Lithuania have since
the late 1990s found agreement on many issues with the conservative American
Lutheran Church–Missouri Synod (LCMS). This co-operation has also entailed
material support for these two Baltic churches. A church intending to seek unity with
the Catholic Church would probably not ﬁrst create close ties with the strongly
confessional, even anti-ecumenical, LCMS.
There are several reasons behind the success of the LCMS’s recent advances in
Latvia and Lithuania. One important factor can be described as a growing
‘confessional awareness’. This means in short a conviction that almost all Western
Lutherans have strayed from the orthodox understanding of Lutheranism’s central
tenets and that the Lutheran churches in the Baltic countries are almost alone
ﬁghting back against a corrupting spirit of materialism and ‘secular humanism’.
‘Disillusioned’ Lithuanian Lutherans returning from international conferences and
other trips abroad observed that ‘a secular agenda had been raised to a level equal to
the Gospel of Jesus Christ’ and that ‘traditional spirituality had been replaced by
environmental and social justice concerns’.20 ‘Confessional awareness’ is sometimes
combined with nostalgia for certain aspects of the Soviet era, when it was easier for a
Christian to know who the enemy was. It also meant that it was easier for a Christian
16Jaan Lahe, ‘Millist kirik me tahame?’ [What kind of Church do we want?], Eesti Kirik, 6
June 2007, http://www.eestikirik.ee/node/3086 (accessed 28 May 2009).
17Cf. Ketola, The Nationality Question, 80–1.
18‘Tegu on missakorra ta¨napa¨evastamisega’ [It is about updating the order of the Mass], Pa¨rnu
Postimees, 2 August 2008, http://www.parnupostimees.ee/030808/artiklid/100879580.0php
(accessed 28 May 2009).
19Dr Pastor Darius Petkunas’s communication to the author, 10 May 2009.
20Petkunas, Resurgence, 31.
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to form his own identity. In an interview, Archbishop Vanags put it in a way which
probably holds true for many of his contemporaries: ‘Persecution acted as a
cleansing force on the Church. All that was false, redundant, ballast, fell away.
Those who continued practising faith were those for whom it was a question of life
or death – the most important issue of all’.21
Baltic church leaders have at times been very sensitive to both real and imagined
attempts at pressure by Western church bodies, for instance concerning female
ordination. This sort of Western ecclesiastical besserwisserism, as it has been called,
and the oﬀence caused by it, may also be a factor contributing to a turning towards
more conservative theological thinking.22 In this respect, the Baltic Lutheran
churches have a sort of love–hate relationship with the Nordelbische Evangelisch-
Lutherische Kirche and the Church of Sweden. They are important co-operation
partners and without their economic help the Baltic churches would be in trouble.
On the other hand, they are perhaps the two most liberal Lutheran churches in the
world and thus a source of much theological grief for the Baltic churches they are
assisting.
Co-operation between the Baltic Lutherans and the LCMS started sometime in
the mid-1990s. In Lithuania, it was preceded by a feeling that the Church was being
pressured from the outside, especially by their close German partners and
supporters, the Nordelbische Evangelisch-Lutherische Kirche and the Lippische
Landeskirche, to adopt liberal theological views and start ordaining women to the
priesthood. However, ‘a new scientiﬁc view of the Bible’ did not gain much traction
among the Lutheran clergy. For many of them, scholarly study of the Bible was just
another name for the method favoured by the Soviet atheistic propagandists who
had often sought support for their claims from ‘German higher critics’ such as
Rudolf Bultmann whom they had called ‘the Copernicus of Biblical exegesis’.23
The Lithuanian Lutheran Bishop Jonas Kalvanas Sr had ordained a woman to
the service of the Lithuanian Evangelical Lutheran Church in Exile in 1990, at a
time when ‘few church oﬃcials felt any need to enter the debates against the
ordination of women’.24 When Bishop Kalvanas died in early 1995 there were strong
expectations that the Church would ﬁnally start liberalising. Prominent Western
observers such as Gerd Stricker of Glaube in der 2. Welt weighed in and predicted a
possible rift within the Church between those who wanted to see Bishop Kalvanas’s
son as his successor and those who wanted to have more democracy and women
pastors in the Church.25
Soon after Bishop Kalvanas Sr died, a member of the Vilnius parish who had just
completed her studies at Wycliﬀe Hall, a Church of England theological college in
Oxford, requested that the Lutheran consistory ordain her as a pastor in the
Lithuanian Lutheran Church. The request was ﬁrst tabled and then denied along
with another similar application. Henning Kramer, the vice-president of the
Nordelbische Kirche tried personally to persuade the Lithuanians to follow
the course of their partner churches in Germany and Scandinavia and approve the
21Zviedre, ‘Life Stories’, 198.
22Stricker, ‘Umstrittene Frauenordination’, 20–3.
23Petkunas, Resurgence, 23–5.
24Ibid., 23.
25Stricker, ‘Bischofsnachfolge’, 6.
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ordination of women. He pointed out that a negative decision could be ‘construed as
a highly prejudicial and discriminatory action’.26
At the July 1995 synod of the Church, Bishop Kalvanas Jr was elected bishop.
The synod also discussed heatedly the subject of women and the ministry. A letter
from the Nordelbische Kirche, insisting that the ministry be opened to women, was
read aloud. Otherwise, it suggested, the German partners would be free to draw their
own conclusions. The obvious threat of losing the Germans’ ﬁnancial support caused
palpable anxiety among the participants. Finally, the synod decided not to vote on
the issue until the question had been investigated by a special theological
commission. The commission was established, but its task remains unﬁnished. No
new women pastors have been ordained to the priesthood in Lithuania since the
1990s.
‘Confessional awareness’ surely played the key role in the rejection of female
priesthood in Lithuania, but there may have been one further inﬂuential factor.
There was the – perhaps unconscious – inﬂuence of the ‘mighty Catholic Church’ on
the thinking of the small band of Lutherans, as the Lithuanian Lutheran Bishop
Jonas Kalvanas Jr allegedly told a German writer.27
The Lutheran World Federation and other Western observers continued to put
pressure on both the Latvian and Lithuanian Lutheran churches to approve the
ordination of women but with no results. According to the Lithuanians themselves, a
further factor convincing them of the corrupt nature of Western Lutheran churches
was the Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justiﬁcation, agreed to by
representatives of the Catholic Church and the Lutheran World Federation in
1999. The Lithuanian Lutherans decided that they could not support the declaration
as ‘an accurate reﬂection of Lutheran and biblical theology’.28
As the turn of the millennium approached, co-operation between the Lithuanian
Lutherans and the LCMS grew ever tighter. The two churches organised joint
conferences in Lithuania in 1998 (Taurage) and 2000 (Klaipeda). For the next synod,
which was held in 2000, the Lutheran consistory proposed that the Church seek
intercommunion with the LCMS. The synod eventually approved the proposal but
only after heated discussion. Glaube in der 2. Welt reported that the delegates felt
themselves under pressure to approve the proposal because there were ﬁve
representatives of the LCMS among the participants. Vice-president Henning
Kramer from the Nordelbische Kirche stated that his Church would have to
withdraw their ﬁnancial support from the Lithuanians because they disapproved of
the LCMS’s anti-ecumenical line. The director of the Theological Center in Memel,
H. Arnasius, warned that a positive decision would mean a spiritual separation from
the rest of Europe. The reasons cited for the decision to seek ‘a closer and deeper
relationship’ with the LCMS were the Church’s ‘clear and orthodox position
regarding the authority of the Scripture, confessional subscription, and sexual
morality’.29
The next year, the synod of the Latvian Lutheran Church arrived at a similar
decision. Again there was ﬁerce opposition, e.g., from the dean of the Theological
Faculty in Riga, who suspected that only a few of the 200 people present at the synod
26Petkunas, Resurgence, 26.
27Lipsius, ‘Die Erneuerung’, 103.
28Petkunas, Resurgence, 32–3.
29Ibid., 34–5.
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knew enough of the theology and character of the LCMS to arrive at an informed
decision. He considered it unwise to narrow the Latvian Lutheran Church’s foreign
co-operation to just one conservative church. Other voices warned that the Latvian
Church would isolate itself, lose foreign ﬁnancial support and endanger its existing
international relationships. Archbishop Vanags was annoyed with the tactics of the
opposition, blaming it for discrediting the whole Church in front of the Latvian
public. ‘Something like this would not have happened in the Catholic Church,’
Vanags reportedly complained.30
In 2001, the delegate convention of the Lutheran Church–Missouri Synod
decided to establish fellowship with both the Latvian and Lithuanian Lutheran
churches. The Lithuanian Lutheran Church continued on the same track when it
decided to move toward closer relations with the conservative Independent
Evangelical Lutheran Church in Germany in 2005.31 Western criticism of the
Latvian and Lithuanian choice of theological orientation has elicited counter-
criticism regarding the failure of Western observers to understand the mentality
within these Baltic churches. In this view, the larger European churches have ‘failed
to appreciate the rising tide of confessional awareness in the Lithuanian and other
Eastern Lutheran Churches’. Furthermore, Western Lutherans are blind to the fact
that the decision to seek closer contact with the LCMS was ‘a response to the
modern liberal orientation in theology and ecclesiology in the Western European
Churches’.32 Many church leaders in Eastern Europe also think they see a
connection between rampant consumerism and societal ills considered as Western
imports and the moral bankruptcy of Western theology.33
So far, the Estonian Lutheran Church has not sought closer ties with the LCMS.
Still, it is obvious that all the Baltic Lutheran churches are of one mind when it
comes to certain matters, for example, attitude toward homosexual relations and
their sinfulness. In 2006, Baltic Lutheran church leaders sent a joint letter of protest
to the Church of Sweden, lamenting the decision of its General Synod on 27 October
2005 to bless homosexual partnerships, as weakening unity and co-operation among
the churches. In the letter, the leaders of the Baltic Lutheran churches declared that
‘the blessing of homosexual unions would not be tolerated in their own churches,
and that they cannot continue in fellowship with priests of sister churches who
practice or support blessing of same-sex couples’.34 Thus, although there are often
signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the intensity and character of the conservatives’
conservatism in the diﬀerent Baltic countries, with respect to some issues they are
easily able to build a uniﬁed front.
The churches, politics and Christian values
It is well known that the churches in each Baltic country had a signiﬁcant role in the
restoration of national sovereignty. However, there were interesting diﬀerences. In
Lithuania and Latvia, the churches acted as a springboard or a home for forces
30Stricker, ‘Lutheraner und Missouri’, 5.
31Petkunas, Resurgence, 35, 47.
32Ibid., 37–8.
33Walters, ‘The Revolutions in Eastern Europe’, 360.
34Lithuanian Evangelical Lutheran Church, ‘Concerned about Unity’, http://www.
liuteronai.lt/titulinis/straipsniai/2006/santuoka/santuoka_ang.htm (accessed 29 May 2009).
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striving for independence. There, the resistance to a large extent originated or at least
was channelled through the churches. In Lithuania, as in Poland, the Catholic
Church was a strong national force. It had a Soviet Union-wide reputation as a
bastion of civil resistance against Soviet ideology. It always had strong connections
to human rights activists within the Soviet Union, for instance to Andrei Sakharov
and Sergei Kovaljov.35 In the Latvian and Estonian churches, human rights issues
never played such a signiﬁcant role. Even today, there is a debate within the Estonian
Lutheran Church, for instance, about whether human rights issues should be a
matter for the Church at all.
Although in Latvia the leadership of the Lutheran Church was very loyal to the
Soviet state, during glasnost and perestroika a group of young reform-minded
pastors organised the Rebirth and Renewal movement to defend the rights of
Christians. The movement was active in extending a Christian inﬂuence into Soviet
Latvian society. Latvia became the ﬁrst Soviet republic in which the Christian
message was broadcast on public radio and TV and in which religious instruction
was provided in schools. Some of the movement’s members helped to found the
Popular Front of Latvia, a party that played an active role in regaining Latvian
independence in 1991.36
In Latvia and Lithuania there were also forces within the churches which were
not so eager to see the status quo ended, but they were soon overwhelmed and
pushed aside. In Latvia, the whole Lutheran consistory, including the archbishop,
was voted out of oﬃce in 1989. It was accused of having cared too much for the
welfare of the Soviet state and too little for Latvian Christians. Similarly, in Estonia,
the whole Lutheran consistory was also replaced in 1990, but Archbishop Kuno
Pajula was allowed to remain in oﬃce. Everyone knew that he had been a loyal
servant of the Soviet state, but as he had obviously not harmed the Church and had
shown a positive attitude towards reforms, no one wanted to humiliate him. The
diﬀerences between the Latvian and Estonian modes of action have also been
explained in terms of diﬀerent national characteristics and mentality.37
In Estonia, the Lutheran Church had not been in the same manner a cornerstone
of the opposition movement. The Church had been closely controlled by the Soviet
security organs and had never been an essential component of Estonian national
identity. This image and the fact that the Church had never spoken out against the
strong Russiﬁcation policies of the state had alienated most ordinary people.
Nevertheless, when the campaign for the restoration of Estonian independence
started, the Lutheran Church and individual pastors became strongly involved,
especially in the activities of the Estonian Heritage Society. The Society, by restoring
churches and monuments destroyed by the Communist regime, worked to revive
Estonian national history and cultural traditions as well as combat Soviet
propaganda. A Lutheran pastor blessing a restored national monument in one
Estonian town or another became a familiar sight in the late 1980s.38
35Fischer, ‘Litauen’, 21–2; Fischer, ‘Katholische Kirche’, 26–8.
36Friedrich, ‘Lettlands Kirche’, 19–24; Rozitis, ‘Wiedergeburt und Erneuerung’, 21–4; Gills
and Krumina-Konkova, ‘The Latvian’, 201–9; Cf. also Elmar E. Rozitis’s reports on the
Latvian Evangelical Church in Kirche im Osten 29–37 (1986–94).
37Stricker, ‘Estlands Lutheraner’, 17–21.
38Pastor Burchard Lieberg chronicles the years 1986–1992 very informatively in his reports on
Estonian church life in Kirche im Osten 29–37 (1986–94). Altnurme, ‘Die Phase des
Zusammenbruchs’, 64–70.
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Christian democratic parties have not been very successful in any of the Baltic
states. Individual pastors have been active in party politics in Latvia and Estonia,
and many of them have been elected to parliament in both countries from the ranks
of diﬀerent parties. In Lithuania, however, Catholic priests have evidently not been
members of parliament, although many of them were active in Sajudis, the political
organisation which led the struggle for Lithuanian independence in the late 1980s
and early 1990s.
In both Latvia and Lithuania, church leaders have criticised politicians for failing
to take satisfactory measures against a wide range of political and social problems
that cause concern for the churches. Corruption in state and government circles,
child abuse, pornography, alcoholism and drug abuse are furthermore commonly
seen as Western imports or caused by the reckless capitalism allowed by politicians.
On some occasions the bitter disillusionment with the post-Communist reality has
led to outright nostalgia for Soviet times. For instance, the leaders of both the
Lutheran and Catholic churches in Latvia are known to have expressed views that
the immorality they were witnessing would not have been allowed under the Soviet
regime. The Latvian Cardinal Janis Pujats has recently accused the post-Communist
Latvian governments of marginalising religion.39 In Lithuania, church leaders have
complained that there are still too many members of the former Soviet nomenklatura
in inﬂuential positions, acting systematically against the Church.40
This sort of disillusionment was illustrated vividly by the boycott staged by
Latvia’s Lutheran, Roman Catholic, Orthodox and Baptist Church leaders in
connection with the main service to mark Independence Day on 18 November 2000.
The service took place in Riga’s Lutheran Cathedral and was attended by the
country’s president and prime minister. Although present, church leaders refused to
take an active part in the service, leaving the sermon and the prayers to be delivered
by ordinary priests and pastors. The Lutheran Archbishop Vanags said the protest
had been staged to focus attention on disappointed public expectations and accused
the country’s politicians of betraying the ‘hopes and emotions’ born in 1991, when
Latvia achieved independence. However, he denied that he was engaged in a conﬂict
with the country’s president.41
At the beginning of the new millennium, American culture wars were to some
extent imported to Latvia. The term culture war is not easy to deﬁne, but in the
United States it has involved politically conservative religious circles, the
Evangelicals being the largest single grouping, who consider public morality a
deﬁning issue in party politics. Family values is a slogan much used by the culture
war warriors. In Latvia, this sort of ideological battle was initiated in 2002 by the
Latvia First Party. The Party was founded by Eriks Jekabsons, a devout Christian
who ﬂed the Soviet Union in 1988 due to alleged KGB persecution and spent the
following 13 years in the United States, where he received a master’s degree in
theology and served for ﬁve years as a Lutheran pastor in Chicago. Upon his return
to Latvia in 2001 he said in an interview: ‘Many of our parliamentary deputies are
not religious, but in America people understand that politics without morality is
39‘Stimmungsbild der Katholiken’, Glaube in der 2. Welt 30, no. 10 (2002): 5.
40‘Stellungnahme katholischer Bischo¨fe’, Glaube in der 2. Welt 20, no. 11 (1992): 4.
41‘Latvia’s Lutheran church leader accuses politicians of betrayal’, LWI News in brief NOV./
DEC. edition. http://www.wfn.org/2000/12/msg00207.html (accessed 29 May 2009).
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maimed, and morality without religion is impossible. Latvia’s politicians and society
don’t realize that’.42
The Latvia First Party won 10 seats in the 101-member parliament in the 2002
elections on an American-style ‘Christian family values’ platform. Whereas, in
general, Latvia’s political parties are rigidly separated on ethnic lines, the Latvia
First Party explicitly endorsed multiculturalism and ethnic integration during the
2002 campaign, seeking to win support among Russian-speaking voters. The Party
has also been explicitly homophobic since its founding congress, and one of its main
contributions to Latvia’s political culture has been the mainstreaming of
homophobia. The Party’s aggressive use of anti-gay rhetoric in its 2002 campaign
suggests that it views homophobia as a useful replacement for anti-Russian
nationalism and an idea that could unite Latvians and Russians.43
Homophobia is strong in Latvian church circles as well. The Lutheran
Archbishop Janis Vanags banned practising gays from receiving Holy Communion
in 1994. Vanags and the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Riga Janis Pujats
contributed chapters to a book published in 2002 by the radical nationalist Aivars
Garda, entitledHomosexuality: Humanity’s Shame and Ruin. The roots of this strong
homophobia can be found partly in the Soviet moral code and education. In the
Soviet Union, homosexuality was a crime.
Since its election success, the Latvia First Party has spoken out against abortion
and campaigned for references to Christian heritage to be included in the EU
constitution treaty. It also secured a highly controversial budgetary allocation for
church renovations under the rubric of promoting ‘sacred’ tourism, which critics
have denounced as a transparent eﬀort to win endorsements from the pulpit. The
party is nicknamed ‘the Preachers’ Party’, because clergy are prominent in its
membership. The party cultivates connections with all of Latvia’s mainstream
denominations, but it has reportedly provoked widespread scepticism through its
close ties with evangelical churches.44
In the summer of 2005, the Latvia First Party was one of the organisers in a
demonstration against the country’s ﬁrst Gay Pride parade. The intensity of
homophobia in Latvia is well illustrated by the fact that, for the ﬁrst time in a
European Union member-state, politicians at the national level – including prime
minister – denounced the march.
The question of the prominence and practical realisation of Christian values in
politics is a tricky one. In Estonia, the Lutheran Church organised a conference in
November 2005 entitled ‘Christian Values in Estonian Politics’. The president, the
prime minister and all the political parties were represented, and all of them had their
own views about what sort of inﬂuence Christian values should have in political
decision-making. Most of the politicians agreed that contemporary ethical norms
have their basis in Christian ethics and that Christian values are needed in Estonian
politics. Family values and their importance were especially underlined heavily in
several contributions. The Estonian prime minister expressed his hope that religious
42Katrina Z.S. Schwartz, ‘Gay rights: United in Hostility’. Central and Eastern European Online
Library, http://www.ceeol.com/aspx/getdocument.aspx?logid¼5&id¼A03F7CF2–5560–4AEC-
BFF4–28874C746F48 (accessed 29 May 2009).
43Ibid.
44Ibid.
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education would soon be a compulsory subject in school.45 Religious education is
one of the greatest causes of controversy between church and state in each of the
Baltic countries.
It seems that in Estonia many leading politicians have a positive personal attitude
towards the Church and are willing to pay homage to Christian values. It is of course
another matter whether this goodwill translates into concrete political action.
Estonian politicians must take into account the fact that many Estonians take a
sceptical view of any kind of organised religion. They are in fact proud of how
secularised Estonia is. As the Estonian opposition leader Edgar Savisaar says about
his relation to religion: ‘My relation to religion is typically Estonian, not very
churchy. I admit there must be religion and that Lutheranism was the religion of my
ancestors, but I don’t consider myself a ﬁery believer’.46 The image of an ordinary
church member as a ﬁery believer – meaning a dangerous and ignorant fanatic – is one
of the unfortunate results of Soviet propaganda. In the opinion of Pastor Villu Jurjo,
a famous dissident in the Soviet period, the Russian party in Estonia is nowadays the
only party where the signiﬁcance of churches is really understood and valued.47
The mainstream churches in all three Baltic states were clearly in favour of EU
membership. In Estonia, the leaders of the EELC favoured EU membership,
whereas some free churches said it was a matter of individual conscience. The public
declaration of EELC in favour of EU three weeks before the referendum of 2003
received a lot of publicity in the media. Archbishop Jaan Kiivit stressed that
Christian traditions have always shaped the European mind and Estonia has always
belonged to Europe.48 In this he echoed the Estonian president Lennart Meri who
had regularly stressed this view in his speeches. Fears were also expressed that
support from the Church might have a negative eﬀect on the Estonians’ vote. Many
of the arguments against Estonian membership were of a religious nature, portraying
the EU as a conspiracy of anti-Christian groups. These arguments often came from
evangelical free church circles. In the referendum, 66% of Estonians voted in favour
of joining the EU.49
The Estonian Lutheran Church’s clear but simple EU campaign was nevertheless
nothing compared to Lithuania where the unrestrained participation of the Catholic
hierarchy in a political campaign was considered quite exceptional. Formal and
informal Church networks encouraged participation in the referendum and sent
clear signals in favour of accession. Churches themselves were one of the most
reliable places to ﬁnd information on EU accession. Special leaﬂets could be found in
every church, and priests handed out ﬂyers after masses. One Lithuanian bishop
reportedly joined a rock concert on the eve of the Lithuanian referendum. According
45Andrus Ansip, ‘Kasvame kristlikel juurtel’ [We have Christian roots], Konverents Kristlikud
va¨a¨rtused Eesti poliitikas, Eesti Evangeelne Luterlik Kirik, http://www.eelk.ee/ettekanne.
php?id¼23 (accessed 29 May 2009).
46Edgar Savisaar, ‘Ajaloo mo˜te on selles, et teda teha’ [The meaning of history is in doing it],
Maaleht, 25 May 2000, http://paber.maaleht.ee/LEHT/2000/05/25/leht.html (accessed 29 May
2009).
47Villu Ju¨rjo, ‘Olla o˜igel momendil o˜iges kohas on kui auhind’ [To be at the right moment at
the right place is like winning a prize], Po˜hjarannik, 28 May 2006, http://www.pohjarannik.ee/
modules.php?name¼News&ﬁle¼article&sid¼2933 (accessed 29 May 2009).
48‘Luterlik kirik palvetab ELiga u¨hinemise eest’ [The Lutheran Church prays for joining the
EU], Eesti Pa¨evaleht, 27 August 2003, http://www.epl.ee/artikkel/243728 (accessed 29 May
2009).
49Altnurme, ‘Vergangenheitsbewa¨ltigung und Neuanfang?’, 139.
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to the head of the central election oﬃce in Vilnius, local priests urged their
congregations to cast their votes on leaving church on the Sunday when the
referendum took place. After the referendum, the chairman of the Lithuanian
parliament singled out clergymen in his remarks, thanking them for urging
parishioners to cast their ballots. It has been estimated that the intensive involvement
of the Catholic Church might have been one of the most important factors in
explaining the positive result.50 This explanation may, however, be too simple,
because the Catholic Church does not have as much popular inﬂuence as it has in
Poland, for instance. The active campaigning of the church in Lithuania must also be
seen in the wider context: From the Vatican came a clear signal as to how Catholics
should vote on this issue.
What will the future hold for the Baltic churches?
In some ways the predicament of the Baltic churches may be a forewarning of what
will be in store for the churches in the West if secularisation continues to advance at
the present pace unless there is a renaissance of religion and an improvement of the
economic circumstances waiting around the corner. Diminishing membership,
declining ﬁnancial resources, dwindling societal inﬂuence, increasing moral and
theological conservatism on issues like women, abortion and homosexuality
characterise especially the situation of the Lutheran churches in the Baltic states.
The Catholic and Orthodox churches seem to have fared somewhat better in material
and membership respects. Of course, one must take into account the fact that the
Baltic churches were badly equipped to meet the modern world after the long
Communist imprisonment. The churches in the West have better tools and resources
to meet challenges.
There are, however, also opportunities for the Baltic churches. The churches may
in the future have a more deeply committed membership, inspiring others to join on
the strength of their personal example. The churches may be pushed to pool
resources and increase co-operation at all levels, thus leading to a sort of ‘practical
ecumenism’ and a reduction of old theological enmities. Lay people, especially
women, may come to have a more prominent and responsible role in church and
parish government, although it seems that the ordination of women in the Latvian
and Lithuanian Lutheran churches will be in limbo for the foreseeable future.
Governments will perhaps acknowledge the churches’ importance in advancing
tolerance and pluralism, not only moral intolerance.
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